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LITIGATION IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
Brian J. Love*
James Yoon†
Draft, v. Sept. 21, 2016
Abstract: In this Essay, we compare U.S. patent litigation across districts and
consider possible explanations for the Eastern District of Texas’s popularity
with patent plaintiffs. Rather than any one explanation, we conclude that what
makes the Eastern District so attractive to patent plaintiffs is the accumulated
effect of several marginal advantages—particularly with respect to the relative
timing of discovery deadlines, transfer decisions, and claim construction—that
make it predictably expensive for accused infringers to defend patent suits filed
in East Texas. These findings tend to support ongoing efforts to pass patent
reform legislation that would presumptively stay discovery in patent suits
pending claim construction and motions to transfer or dismiss. However, we
also observe that judges in the Eastern District of Texas tend to exercise their
discretion in ways that dampen the effect of prior legislative and judicial
reforms that were aimed (at least in part) at deterring abusive patent suits.
Given the broad discretion courts have to control how cases proceed, this
additional finding suggests that legislation restricting venue in patent cases
may well be the single most effective reform available to Congress.
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Patent Litigation in the E.D. Tex.
INTRODUCTION

After two terms of serious congressional interest in patent reform,
including the introduction of roughly twenty competing bills,1 only only one
piece of prospective reform legislation still stands a reasonable chance of
passage: the VENUE Act.2 Introduced in March by Senators Flake, Gardner,
and Lee, the bill would (with few exceptions) limit where patent suits can be
filed to only those districts in which the accused infringer is incorporated or in
which either party has a “regular and established physical facility” for research
or production.3 Many predict that, despite the eventual failures of the many
bills that came before, this rather brief piece of legislation has a legitimate shot
at passing through Congress by the end of 2016.
Though you won’t find it anywhere in the bill’s text, the VENUE Act’s
target is crystal clear: the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
a court made infamous as the location of choice for America’s “patent trolls,”
companies formed solely for the purpose of monetizing patent rights through
litigation, often using methods that seem to leverage the costs and burdens of
litigation more so than the value of the patented technology.4 Since the mid2000s the Eastern District has established a reputation as a “renegade
jurisdiction”5 that actively cultivates, or at least tolerates,6 an image as the go1

For a summary of the various bills introduced in the House and Senate since 2013, see Patent
Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, http://www.patentprogress.org/patentprogress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-patent-reform-legislation/ (last accessed
Aug. 28, 2016).
2
Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th Cong. (2016),
available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2733/. The VENUE Act
has been referred to, for example, as a “last stand” or “last ditch effort” for patent reform
supporters. See Holly Fechner et al., Senators Introduce VENUE Act as Last Stand on Patent
Legislation This Congress, Global Policy Watch blog (Mar. 22, 2016),
https://www.globalpolicywatch.com/2016/03/senators-introduce-venue-act-as-last-stand-onpatent-legislation-this-congress/; Andrew Williams, The Venue Act – A Last-Ditch Attempt at
Patent Reform, Patent Docs blog (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.patentdocs.org/2016/03/thevenue-act-a-last-ditch-attempt-at-patent-reform.html.
3
S. 2733, supra, at § 2(a). This is not the first time Congress has considered venue reform for
patent cases. Most recently, a patent-specific venue provision was included in the ultimately
unsuccessful Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. §8(a) (2006).
4
For a general overview of how non-practicing patent holders can impose asymmetric costs in
patent litigation and thereby induce nuisance value settlements, see Informational Hearing on
Patent Assertion Entities before the California Assembly Select Committee on High
Technology (Oct 30, 2013) (statement of Brian J. Love, Assistant Professor of Law, Santa
Clara University), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm.?abstract_id=2347138.
5
As Justice Scalia once famously referred to the district. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1011, eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130) (“[T]hat’s a problem with
Marshall, Texas, not with the patent law . . . . I don't think we should . . . write our patent law
because
we
have
some
renegade
jurisdictions.”),
available
at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-130.pdf. Others have
been more direct in expressing their displeasure with the court. Texas Monthly once dubbed
the Eastern District of Texas “[maybe] the worst thing that ever happened to intellectual

2
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to jurisdiction for patent litigation. In recent years word of the Eastern District
of Texas spread far enough that the rural court and its judges have garnered
attention from the likes of the New York Times,7 VICE,8 NPR,9 and HBO’s
John Oliver.10
In this Essay, we take a close, up-to-date empirical look at how U.S.
patent litigation plays out in districts across the nation and consider the extent
to which the Eastern District of Texas’s reputation is justified.11 While the
appeal of the Eastern District to patent plaintiffs is undeniable (almost 44
percent of all patent cases in 2015 were filed in the district), a simple
explanation for the district’s popularity is surprisingly hard to articulate.
Though we find evidence that the Eastern District of Texas is relatively
plaintiff-friendly in certain respects, we also observe that allegedly
“defendant-friendly” jurisdictions12 such as the Northern District of California
have characteristics that in many respects are quite similar.13
property law.” Annette Waller & Loren Steffy, Patently Unfair, Texas Monthly, Oct. 2014,
available at http://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/patently-unfair/. The court is also ranked
ninth on the American Tort Reform Foundation’s list of “Judicial Hellholes.” Judicial
Hellholes:
U.S.
District
Court
for
the
Eastern
District
of
Texas,
http://www.judicialhellholes.org/2015-2016/u-s-district-court-for-the-eastern-district-of-texas/
(last accessed Aug. 29, 2016).
6
There is at least some evidence that the people of East Texas, if not also the judiciary,
recognize and welcome the economics benefits that come from the local patent litigation
boom. For example, Tyler4Tech, “a consortium of Tyler, Texas’ local civic, education and
private enterprise leaders, companies and organizations,” touts on its website the region’s
“plaintiff-friendly local rules, speedy dispositions, and principled jurors who understand the
value of Intellectual Property.” Tyler4Tech, http://tyler4tech.com/index.html (last accessed
Aug. 29, 2016). For a thorough examination of the phenomenon of “forum selling” in the
Eastern District of Texas, including the indirect financial benefits of patent litigation for the
local economy, see Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. Cal. L. Rev. 241
(2016).
7
Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2006; Edgar
Walters, Tech Companies Fight Back Against Patent Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 2014.
8
Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s Patent Cases,
Motherboard, May, 5 2016, https://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-small-town-judge-whosees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases.
9
When Patents Attack!, This American Life (NPR radio broadcast Jul. 22, 2011), available at
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-patents-attack.
10
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO television broadcast Apr. 19, 2015), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bxcc3SM_KA&noredirect=1.
11
For a summary of inter-district variation in patent litigation during prior years, see, e.g.,
John Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 Tex. L. Rev.
1769 (2014); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1444 (2010); Kimberly A.
Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79
N.C. L. Rev. 889 (2001).
12
Letter to Congress from 28 Law Professors & Economists Urging Caution on the VENUE
Act, Aug. 1, 2016, http://cpip.gmu.edu/2016/08/01/law-professors-economists-urge-caution-
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Rather than any one of the traditional narratives explaining the appeal of
East Texas, we conclude that what makes the Eastern District so attractive to
patent plaintiffs is the accumulated effect of several marginal advantages,
particularly with respect to the timing and success rate of important pretrial
events. To borrow a shopworn phrase, the devil is in the details—specifically
the nitty gritty details of seemingly mundane procedural choices, like the
relative timing of discovery deadlines, transfer decisions, and claim
construction. This observation suggests to us that, among reforms like those
included in the Innovation Act and other recent omnibus patent reform bills,14
mandatory delays in discovery may be the most effective at protecting
companies from abusive patent enforcement in East Texas and elsewhere.
However, we also find evidence that judges in the Eastern District of
Texas have generally exercised their discretion in the past in ways that
dampen the effect of prior patent reform measures and Supreme Court
opinions that would otherwise have shifted leverage in patent suits away from
“trolls” and toward accused infringers. This observation leads us to the
conclusion that there may well be no simple fix, apart from venue reform, that
will end the Eastern District of Texas’s popularity with patent plaintiffs.
Because judges have broad, and largely unappealable,15 discretion to control
when and how motions are heard and the way cases proceed in their
courtrooms, almost any other reform may ultimately prove toothless if judges
choose not to embrace them. As retired Magistrate Judge Judith Guthrie of
Tyler, Texas once cautioned: “[a]nybody who applies to be a judge in the
Eastern District knows what the deal is . . . . It’s like an unspoken job
on-venue-act-in-letter-to-congress/ (stating that the District of Delaware and the Northern
District of California “are recognized as more friendly to defendants”).
13
In fact, the Eastern District of Texas adopted its local patent rules from those already in
place in the Northern District of California. For a comparison of the districts’ respective local
rules, see Jenner & Block LLP, Chart Comparing the Local Patent Rules,
https://jenner.com/system/assets/assets/6962/original/Local_20Patent_20Rules_20Chart.pdf
(last accessed Aug. 28, 2016).
14
In 2013, the Innovation Act, H.R.3309, 113th Cong. (2013), passed the House but
ultimately stalled in the Senate. It was introduced again the next term, H.R. 9, 114th Cong.
(2015), but again failed to gain traction. The Innovation Act included, among other reforms: a
presumption that attorney’s fees be awarded to prevailing parties in patent cases, mandatory
discovery stays pending motions to transfer or dismiss, and codification of an expanded
customer suit exception. Id.
15
“District courts . . . are afforded broad discretion to control and manage their dockets,
including the authority to decide the order in which they hear and decide issues pending
before
them.” Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Intermediate, discretionary rulings like these are not immediately appealable, 28 U.S.C. §
1291 (limiting appellate jurisdiction to “final decisions of the district courts”), and, when
appealed, are reviewed under a permissive “abuse of discretion” standard, Highmark, Inc. v.
Allcare Health Mgmt. System, Inc., (“[D]ecisions on ‘matters of discretion’ are ‘reviewable
for abuse of discretion.’” (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988))).
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description. It will continue until the bar decides to file elsewhere or until
Congress changes the law.”16 Accordingly, restricting patentees’ ability to file
suit in East Texas in the first place may be the single most effective reform
available to Congress.
I. THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS’S POPULARITY
Looking first at patent caseloads nationwide, we re-confirm what has
long been known: that the Eastern District of Texas is wildly popular with
patent plaintiffs, particularly those whose core business is enforcing “high
tech” patents.17 As shown below in Table 1, more than a third of patent suits
filed since 2014 were brought in the Eastern District.18 In fact, one judge—
Judge Rodney Gilstrap of Marshall, Texas—saw almost one quarter of all
patent case filings nationwide during the same timeframe, more than all the
federal judges in California, New York, and Florida combined.19
16

Waller & Steffy, supra note _.
For more on the Eastern District of Texas’s rise to prominence in patent litigation, see Yan
Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of
the Eastern District of Texas As a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 Yale J. L. &
Tech. 193 (2007); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade Jurisdiction”: Lessons for
Patent Law Review, 83 Tulane L. Rev. 111 (2008) (presenting statistics on patent litigation in
the Eastern District of Texas for the period 1996 to 2006); Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real
Reasons the Eastern District of Texas Draws Patent Cases: Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14
SMU Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 299 (2011) (presenting statistics on patent litigation in the Eastern
District of Texas for the period 1991 to 2010).
18
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) provides that “[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be
brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” 28
U.S.C. § 1391(d) states that, for venue purposes, a corporate defendant “shall be deemed to
reside in any district . . . within which its contacts would be sufficient to subject it to personal
jurisdiction if that district were a separate State.” As interpreted by the Federal Circuit, these
statutory rules make jurisdiction for patent suits proper in any federal district in which the
accused product is sold. In re T.C. Heartland, LLC, No. 2016-105, at *10 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 29,
2016) (stating that jurisdiction exists “where a nonresident defendant purposefully shipped
accused products into the forum through an established distribution channel and the cause of
action for patent infringement was alleged to arise out of those activities”). As a result, a
patentee contemplating suit against a national retailer, or the producer of any of its products,
can essentially file suit in the district of its choice.
19
According to Lex Machina, between 2014 and mid-2016 Judge Gilstrap saw 3,166 new
patent suits, more than the combined total of all district courts in California, Florida, and New
York: 2,656. Judge Gilstrap’s popularity is attributable, at least in part, to the fact that he is
currently assigned 95 percent of all civil cases filed in the Marshall Division. U.S. District
Court
for the
Eastern District of Texas
General Order No. 16-7,
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin2/view_document.cgi?document=25551. In most other
districts, new cases are assigned randomly across all judges in the district (or across all judges
in the district who are participating in the Patent Pilot Program). Because the Eastern District
of Texas does not follow this convention, patentees that file suit in East Texas have the unique
17
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What makes this level of concentration even more remarkable is where it
takes place. East Texas saw more patent suits since 2014 than the districts that
contain California’s Silicon Valley, Massachusetts’ Route 128, Detroit’s
Automation Alley, Illinois’ Golden Corridor, and North Carolina’s Research
Triangle.20 In contrast to the Northern District of California, which is home to
a population of over 6.2 million residents, the Eastern District of Texas’s
population is (despite spanning three times as many counties) under 3.9
million.21 Marshall, Texas, where almost a third of all patent suits are filed
today,22 has a population just shy of 25,000.23 In short, rather than being a
jurisdiction of convenience for America’s tech industry, the Eastern District
has attracted the majority of all patent suits in the U.S. despite lacking its own
technology hub.24

ability to select which judge will hear their case (with a high degree of probability) by filing
suit in a division that assigns a large percentage of its civil docket to a particular judge. Prior
standing orders on civil case assignment in the Eastern District likely also contributed to the
outsized popularity of several former East Texas judges who attracted large patent dockets
during their time on the bench. See Klerman & Reilly, supra note _, at 252-56 (noting, for
example, that “at the outset of the Eastern District’s popularity in 2006, patentees filing in the
Marshall division were told they had a 70% chance of being assigned to Judge Ward, those
filing in Tyler a 60% chance of Judge Davis, . . . and those filing in Texarkana a 90% chance
of Judge Folsom”).
20
According to Lex Machina, between 2014 and mid-2016, 4,736 patent suits were filed in the
Eastern District of Texas, while the Northern District of California saw 595 patent suits, the
District of Massachusetts saw 154, the Eastern District of Michigan saw 159, the Northern
District of Illinois saw 448, and the Middle and Eastern Districts of North Carolina
collectively saw 79.
21
A list of counties included in each judicial district can be found, for example, via the U.S.
Marshals Service, https://www.usmarshals.gov/district/ (last accessed Aug. 29, 2016).
Population estimates for Texas and California counties can be found, for example, here
Population
Estimates
of
Texas
Counties,
2010-2015,
https://www.tsl.texas.gov/ref/abouttx/popcnty2010-11.html (last accessed Aug. 29, 2016);
California
Counties
by
Population,
http://www.californiademographics.com/counties_by_population (last accessed Aug. 29, 2016).
22
According to Lex Machina, Judges Gilstrap and Schroeder of the Marshall Division
collectively preside over 93 percent of all patent cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas.
23
Population:
Marshall,
Texas,
https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=
kf7tgg1uo9ude_&met_y=population&idim=place:4846776&hl=en&dl=en (last accessed Aug.
29, 2016) (displaying data collected from the U.S. Census Bureau).
24
Klerman & Reilly, supra note _, at 243 (“[The Eastern District of Texas] is home to no
major cities or technology firms.”). In fact, though the Eastern District’s Sherman Division
includes a portion of the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex—perhaps most notably several suburbs
of Dallas located in Collin and Denton Counties—very few patent cases are filed in the
Sherman Division. According to Lex Machina, Judges Crone, Mazzant, and Schell of the
Sherman Division presided over just 44 of the 4,736 patent cases filed in the Eastern District
during the period of our study.
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Table 1: Patent Case Filings by District (Jan. 2014 - June 2016)25
Num. Dist.
Judgeships26

2014

2015

2016 (to 7/1)

Total

Total per
Judgeship

E.D. Tex.

8

1427

2541

768

4,736

592

D. Del.

4

946

545

201

1,692

423

C.D. Cal.

28

335

300

153

788

28.1

N.D. Cal.

14

259

229

107

595

42.5

D.N.J.

17

286

272

110

668

39.3

N.D. Ill.

22

157

163

128

448

20.4

S.D.N.Y.

28

120

155

59

334

11.9

S.D. Fl.

18

111

131

85

327

18.2

S.D. Cal.
All Other
Districts

13

75

80

62

217

16.7

535

1,371

1,409

568

3,348

6.3

J. Gilstrap

1

988

1686

492

3,166

3,166

All Except
E.D. Tex.

679

3,660

3,284

1,473

8,417

12.4

Total

687

5,087

5,825

2,241

13,153

19.1

In addition to its sheer size, the population of cases in East Texas is also
noteworthy for its composition. Table 2 shows that, far from a random
assortment of cases, the Eastern District of Texas’s caseload skews heavily
toward computing and telecommunications technology, and is almost entirely
made up of cases filed by patent assertion entities (PAEs)—companies that
exist to monetize patents, rather than commercialize the technology they
cover. While cases involving pharmaceutical and medical patents are
primarily located in close proximity to where those industries are most
concentrated—in California and New Jersey27—the same is not true for
patents that cover computing technology. None of the U.S. computer

25

LexMachina, All Court Case Filings by Year: All Patent Case Filed by Year,
https://law.lexmachina.com/court/table#Patent-tab (last accessed August 21, 2016).
26
These are counts of the total number of congressionally authorized judgeships in each
district. U.S. Courts, Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships - District Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronological-historyauthorized-judgeships-district-courts (last accessed August 21, 2016). The total count
includes district judgeships on territorial courts. Note that not all judgeships were filled
during the entire period of this study.
27
Of the top ten pharmaceutical companies ranked by revenue earned in the U.S. in 2014, five
are based in California and two in New Jersey. Top 15 Pharma Companies in the US,
http://www.pmlive.com/top_pharma_list/us_revenues (last accessed Aug. 30, 2016). The
other three are based in Europe. Id.
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industry’s most prolific patent applicants has so much as a single office in East
Texas.28
The gulf between the locus of original innovation and of later patent
assertion is likely explained in part by the fact that so few cases filed in East
Texas are filed by companies that actually produce and sell technology.
Instead, cases in the Eastern District of Texas are overwhelmingly filed by
entities created expressly for the purpose of litigating patent suits. No other
district comes even close. Because these parties generally lack a principal
place of business—or, for that matter, assets other than the patents in suit—
they have the flexibility to form an LLC and file suit wherever they deem most
advantageous for litigation purposes.29

28

For a list of companies with the top ten largest U.S. patent portfolios (all of which are
computing and electronics companies), see Joff Wild, The biggest US patent portfolio is not
owned by IBM, but by Samsung Electronics, Intell. Asset Mgmt. blog, Apr. 11, 2016,
http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=b174a267-c73b-4f99-aa9b-dd4b21f3e217.
According to Lex Machina, since January 2014 only one of these ten companies filed a patent
infringement case in the Eastern District of Texas, and that company filed just one suit.
Hitachi Maxwell, Ltd. v. Top Victory Electronics (Taiwan) Co., No. 2:14-cv-01121 (E.D. Tex.
2014).
29
Many have noted the proliferation of empty offices in East Texas leased by patent-holding
LLCs for purposes of manufacturing an apparent connection to the Eastern District. See, e.g.,
Allan Pusey, Marshall Law: Patent Lawyers Flock to East Texas Court for its Expertise and
‘Rocket Docket’, Dallas Morning News, Mar. 26, 2006, at 1D (“Office suites housing nothing
but banker’s boxes and patent paperwork are not uncommon in Marshall.”); When Patents
Attack!, supra note _ (noting that a patentee filing suit in the Eastern District “has no
researchers, no employees of any kind that we can find, and it’s only place of business seems
to be an empty office in a corridor of empty offices in a small town in Texas”); Timothy B.
Lee, These Empty Offices Are Costing the US Economy Billions, Vox, June 8, 2016,
http://www.vox.com/2016/6/8/11886080/patent-trolls-eastern-texas (describing and linking to
a video of software developer Austin Meyer’s attempt to visit the East Texas offices of several
PAEs).
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Table 2: Tech., Plaintiff, and Claim Types
by District (Jan. 2014 - June 2016)30
Technology at Issue in Case
PAE Cases

Declar.
Judg.
Actions

93.9%

0.3%

Computing &
Telecomm

Pharmaceutical
& Medical

Other

91.8%

2.9%

5.3%

D. Del.

57.4

33.7

9.0

59.0

3.2

C.D. Cal.

39.5

8.2

52.3

44.9

8.1

N.D. Cal.

81.4

5.1

13.4

62.4

10.7

D.N.J.

20.5

68.7

10.8

18.3

4.0

N.D. Ill.

57.6

9.6

32.8

51.9

7.2

S.D.N.Y.

48.9

14.7

36.4

41.7

6.6

S.D. Fl.

65.9

9.1

25.0

66.5

6.1

S.D. Cal.
All Other
Districts
All Except
E.D. Tex.

53.7

7.9

38.3

43.3

5.5

38.6

12.7

48.7

38.0

7.8

47.1

20.1

32.8

45.3

6.6

63.5

13.8

22.7

62.9

4.3

E.D. Tex.

Total

Finally, it is worth noting that the Eastern District of Texas’s
popularity is almost entirely driven by the preferences of patent enforcers, not
those of accused infringers. Though it has been suggested by some that the
Eastern District may be popular due to a general preference for efficiency and
judicial expertise among all patent litigants,31 case filing statistics do not bear
this out. As shown above in Table 2, the Eastern District of Texas sees
declaratory judgment filings at a rate well below the national average. In other

30

We are grateful to Unified Patents for making this data available to us. We adopted the
three technology classes used by Unified Patents, see Unified Patents, 2015 Patent Dispute
Report, Dec. 31, 2015, https://www.unifiedpatents.com/news/2016/5/30/2015-patent-disputereport (“High-tech = Technologies relating to Software, Hardware, and Networking. Medical
= Technologies relating to Pharmaceuticals, Medical Devices, Health Related Technologies.
Other = Technologies relating to Mechanical, Packaged Goods, Sporting Equipment and any
other area outside of high-tech and medical patents.”).
31
See Samuel F. Baxter, Eastern District of Texas: Fair and Just Patent Outcomes for
Plaintiffs
and
Defendants,
Metro.
Corp.
Counsel,
Sept.
1,
2007,
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/8817/eastern-district-texas-fair-and-just-patentoutcomes-plaintiffs-and-defendants; Christopher P. Gerardi, Inside the Busiest Patent Court in
America: A Discussion with Chief Judge Leonard Davis, FTI J., Feb. 2014,
http://ftijournal.com/article/inside-the-busiest-patent-court-in-america.
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words, when accused infringers are given the opportunity to select the venue
for litigation, they disproportionately choose a different court.
Viewed together, these findings give us pause. While the Eastern
District’s popularity alone may not be cause for serious concern,32 we find that
the court’s appeal is not shared by all kinds of litigants. Since 2014, more than
90 percent of patent suits filed in East Texas were filed by PAEs enforcing
high tech patents. Accused infringers, by contrast, chose to file suit in East
Texas at a rate less than one tenth that seen in other districts. Moreover, there
appears to be nothing special about the East Texas economy that explains this
dichotomy.
Rather, cases litigated in the Eastern District of Texas
overwhelmingly involve patents covering inventions made elsewhere, asserted
against parties located elsewhere, and by plaintiffs with little or no connection
to the region prior to filing a complaint.33
II. WHY IS THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF TEXAS SO POPULAR?
While the Eastern District’s popularity with patent enforcers has been
well documented for years, there is less certainty on the reasons why this
district has become the venue of choice for patent monetization. Reviewing
the evidence, we find a number of plausible answers. However, we ultimately
conclude that the answer is likely more complex than traditional narratives
suggest.
A. Is the Eastern District of Texas a “Rocket Docket”?
One common explanation for the Eastern District of Texas’s popularity
is its reputation as a fast docket—i.e., a jurisdiction where cases proceed to
trial quickly, which in turn allows plaintiffs to recover faster while placing
greater pressure on defendants to settle.34 Many current and former East Texas
32

In theory, at least. In practice, we question whether it is ever possible for a single judge or
small group of judges to effectively oversee many thousands of lawsuits at once, regardless of
the causes of action alleged.
33
Klerman & Reilly, supra note _, at 255-56 (“[P]atent cases generally have a tenuous
connection to the Eastern District based on the sale of a few allegedly infringing products
somewhere in the district.”).
34
See, e.g., Creswell, supra note _ (“What’s behind the rush to file patent lawsuit here [in the
Eastern District of Texas]? A combination of quick trials and plaintiff-friendly juries, many
lawyers say.”); Rogers, supra note _ (attributing the Eastern District of Texas’s early
popularity with patent plaintiffs to the district’s lack of a criminal docket and, thus, relative
speed in civil matters); Jeff Bounds, New Patent Infringement Lawsuits in East Texas Shatter
Records, Dallas Morning News, Aug. 18, 2015 (“The Eastern District of Texas became
popular with patent lawyers a decade ago when the federal judges there created a so-called
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judges have reinforced this reputation by publicly expressing a preference for
getting cases to trial, and quickly.35 We find support for this hypothesis, but
less than many might expect.
First, we do find that patent litigation generally moves quickly in the
Eastern District of Texas. Eastern Texas patent cases tend to settle early (and
at high rates), and when cases do not settle, they generally make it to trial
faster than patent suits litigated in other courts. As shown below in Table 3,
patent cases in the Eastern District that go to trial tend to make it to a jury in
less than two years, about 5 months faster than the nationwide median.
Among districts that saw at least 15 trials in the last two and a half years, the
Eastern District has a median time-to-trial that is over two months faster than
the next fastest court.

rocket docket, allowing patent holders to move through the pretrial process more quickly and
get to trial sooner.”).
35
See Symposium, The History and Development of the EDTX as a Court with Patent
Expertise: From TI Filing, to the First Markman Hearing, to the Present, 14 SMU Sci. &
Tech. L. Rev. 253, 263 (2011) (“We believe in trial by jury, the no-nonsense expectations of
lawyers to act in a professional way, getting cases to trial quickly, firm trial settings, and not
deviating from them.” (quoting Judge Leonard Davis, retired)); John R. Bone & David A.
Haas, Interview with Former Chief Judge David Folsom of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas, Spring 2013, http://www.srr.com/article/interview-former-chiefjudge-david-folsom-us-district-court-eastern-district-texas (“Judge Ward and I always tried to
maintain a scheduling order that would have the case ready for trial within 18 months, maybe
24 months of the filing date . . . . I think we should always give thought to how to move the
docket; do it quickly.” (quoting Judge David Folsom, retired)).
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Table 3: Patent Case Terminations, Settlements,
and Trials by District (Jan. 2014 - June 2016)36
Terminations
Median
Num.
Days to
Term.

Settlements
Num.
Median
(as % of all
Days to
terms.)
Settle.

Trials
% of Cases
Settled w/in
1 Year

Num.

Median
Days
to Trial

E.D. Tex.

4,963

188

4,341 (87.5%)

174

81.50%

43

717

D. Del.

2,493

400

1,961 (78.7)

355

50.6

68

819

C.D. Cal.

982

251

640 (65.2)

240

64.1

15

795

N.D. Cal.

687

262

491 (71.5)

227

65.4

25

867

D.N.J.

591

266

307 (51.9)

182

67.8

23

801

N.D. Ill.

536

239

386 (72.0)

191

67.6

8

1482

S.D.N.Y.

378

227

269 (71.2)

157

74

17

868

37

S.D. Fl.

337

120

228 (67.6)

99

93

3

454

S.D. Cal.
All Other
Districts

303

263

238 (78.5)

243

65.5

3

581

3,779

259

2,726 (72.1)

237

66.5

101

1125

All Except
E.D. Tex.

10,086

274

7,246 (71.8)

246

63.1

263

899

Total

15,049

237

11,587 (77.0)

210

70.0

306

861

We also observe that cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas tend to
reach a faster conclusion regardless of the manner in which they are
terminated. Among all cases terminated during the period we study, those in
the Eastern District conclude about six months faster than those in the District
of Delaware and close to two months faster than the national median.
Looking just at those cases that settle, we again see a similar pattern.
Among all cases settled between 2014 and mid-2016, those in the Eastern
District settled about four months faster than in the next most popular venue,
the District of Delaware, and over two months faster than the national median.
Looking closer still to cases that settled relatively quickly—within one year of
36

We collected these statistics using Lex Machina. The medians reported are the median days
to termination, settlement, or trial for all cases in the listed populations that were terminated,
settled, or tried between January 1, 2014 and June 30, 2016.
37
Statistics for the Southern District of Florida are skewed heavily by the actions of one
patentee, Shipping and Transit, LLC (FKA ArrivalStar), which filed 110 suits in the district
during the period of our study. These suits also terminated exceptionally quickly, settling
after a median of just 65 days. For background on Shipping and Transit LLC’s litigation
tactics, see, e.g., Jacqueline Bell, Notorious IP Plaintiff ArrivalStar Back On The Hunt,
Law360, Mar. 5, 2015, http://www.law360.com/articles/628275/notorious-ip-plaintiffarrivalstar-back-on-the-hunt.
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filing—we also see a disproportionate number in the Eastern District of Texas.
While about seventy percent of patent cases nationwide settled in their first
year, the Eastern District saw more than eighty percent of its cases end within
a year after filing. In the District of Delaware, by comparison, only half of
cases settled within one year. In fact, with the exception of the Southern
District of Florida, which saw less than one-tenth as many terminations and
trials during the same period of time, the Eastern District of Texas is the
fastest venue among the top ten most popular to settlement, to trial, and to
overall termination.
That said, the Eastern District is only marginally faster than many other
districts, and it is not the overall fastest. Among the most popular districts for
patent suits, that distinction goes to the Southern District of Florida, and
nationwide to the Eastern District of Virginia, the original “rocket docket,”
where patent cases make it to trial more than twice as fast as those in the
Eastern District of Texas.38 Moreover, the Eastern District of Texas’s
popularity with patentees has continued to grow over time despite the district’s
rising case load and consequent drop in speed.39 If speed were patentees’
primary criteria for venue selection, we would expect to see cases filed across
a larger number of districts in a manner that achieves a more natural
equilibrium.
B. Are East Texas Judges and Juries Patentee-Friendly?
Yet another common explanation for East Texas’s dominant position in
patent litigation is a belief that the district is home to judges and jurors who

38

See, e.g., Robert M. Tata, Virginia’s ‘Rocket Docket’ Continues To Roar, Law360, Apr. 17,
2015,
http://www.law360.com/articles/644064/virginia-s-rocket-docket-continues-to-roar
(“[T]he Eastern District of Virginia―known nationally as the “Rocket Docket”―had the
fastest trial docket in the country in 2014 . . . . for the seventh year in a row.”).
39
Leychkis, supra note _, at 210 (“[The Eastern District of Texas] patent docket has been
slowing in recent years as the judges are inundated with more and more new cases.”). Indeed,
many have predicted (incorrectly so far) over the years that the Eastern District’s popularity
would eventually shift to other districts with faster dockets. See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, Texas IP
Rocket
Docket
Headed
for
Burnout?,
Nat’l
L.J.,
Dec.
28,
2004,
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=900005541644/Texas-IP-Rocket-Docket-Headed-forBurnout?slreturn=20160731164911; Fromer, supra note _, at 1483 (“[T]he Eastern District of
Texas might be on the decline as an artificial cluster [of patent litigation], while the Western
District of Wisconsin is an up-and-comer.”); Pusey, supra note _, at 1D (“There is . . . trouble
on the horizon [for the Eastern District of Texas]. Patent cases that used to take eight to 12
months to resolve are now taking 20 to 24 months. And districts in Pennsylvania and
Wisconsin are promoting their own rocket dockets to bring intellectual property cases their
way.”).
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are unusually sympathetic to plaintiffs.40 Indeed, the district was a popular
venue for mass tort cases before the rise of patent suits and many lawyers and
judges in the area cut their teeth litigating these cases.41 We also find
statistical support for this hypothesis, but again less than conventional wisdom
might suggest.
First, as shown below in Table 4, we find that judges in the Eastern
District are less likely than their counterparts in other parts of the nation to
grant motions to transfer. In fact, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has taken the extraordinary stop of issuing a writ of mandamus
ordering the Eastern District to transfer a patent case four times since 2014,
something it has otherwise done just once during the same period across all
cases litigated in the other 93 districts.42 In addition, we observe that when
East Texas judges do transfer cases, they do so much later in the pre-trial
process. Cases transferred out of the Eastern District of Texas are over twice
as old as those transferred out of the Northern and Central Districts of
California. Compared to the national average, the Eastern District of Texas
takes more than 100 days longer to grant motions to transfer venue.

40

See Lee Cheng, Patent Troll Venue Abuse Must Stop in the Eastern District of Texas,
TribTalk, Oct. 28, 2015 (“What makes trolls like [the Eastern District of Texas]? . . . . [T]he
perception, and reality, that the district is favorable to plaintiffs. Historically, Eastern District
patent cases have been propelled quickly toward high win rates and large damage awards
favoring plaintiffs.”); Bounds, supra note _ (“‘While the Eastern District of Texas may not be
the rocket docket it once was, and even though the size of jury verdicts has generally declined
in recent years, the Eastern District of Texas still boasts an environment that is very friendly
towards plaintiffs . . . .’” (quoting Tyler T. VanHoutan, Partner, Winston & Strawn)); When
Patents Attack!, supra note _ (“Many people say that it has to do with juries in Marshall,
they’re famously plaintiff-friendly, friendly to patent owners trying to get a large verdict.”).
41
See Klerman & Reilly, supra note _, at 272 (“Long before East Texas was a hotbed for
patent litigation, it was a focal point for personal injury, products liability, and medical
malpractice litigation, including major class actions against the asbestos, pharmaceutical, and
tobacco industries.”). In fact, many attribute the rise of patent litigation in East Texas at least
in part to the impact that tort reform had on the local tort docket. See Ronen Avraham & John
M. Golden, From PI to IP: Yet Another Unexpected Effect of Tort Reform, U of Texas Law,
Law and Econ Research Paper No. 211 (2012); Creswell, supra note _ (“In Marshall, an ofttold joke is that the passage of tort reform was when many local lawyers . . . moved out of
personal injury and into intellectual property.”).
42
We calculated this statistic by searching DocketNavigator for Federal Circuit rulings that
address requests for writs of mandamus. See also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit
Mandamus, 45 Ind. L. Rev. 343, 346 (2012) (“Before December 2008 . . . the Federal Circuit
had never granted a mandamus petition to overturn a transfer decision, denying each one of
the twenty-two petitions it had decided on that issue. It is therefore surprising that the Federal
Circuit has, on ten occasions since December 2008, granted mandamus to order the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas to transfer a patent case”).
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Table 4: Patent Case Motions to Transfers
by District (Jan. 2014 - June 2016)

E.D. Tex.

Num.43

Grant

Deny

Other

Median Days
to Transfer44

346

164 (47.4%)

154 (44.5%)

28 (8.1%)

340

D. Del.

92

48 (52.2)

33 (35.9)

11 (11.9)

286

C.D. Cal.

46

20 (43.5)

24 (52.2)

2 (4.3)

165

N.D. Cal.

26

13 (50)

11 (42.3)

2 (7.7)

137

D.N.J.

25

17 (68)

5 (20)

3 (12)

290

N.D. Ill.

34

22 (64.7)

8 (23.6)

4 (11.8)

136

S.D.N.Y.

8

5 (62.5)

3 (37.5)

0 (0)

308

S.D. Fl.

31

23 (74.2)

8 (25.8)

0 (0)

161

S.D. Cal.
All Other
Districts
All Except
E.D. Tex.

9

5 (55.5)

3 (33.3)

1 (11.1)

188

289

145 (50.2)

135 (46.7)

9 (3.1)

279

560

298 (53.2)

230 (41.1)

32 (5.7)

189

906

462 (51.0)

384 (42.4)

60 (6.6)

232

Total

We also see that East Texas judges are disproportionately unlikely to
grant motions for summary judgment of non-infringement or invalidity. As
shown below in Table 5, judges in the Eastern District of Texas grant
summary judgment in defendants’ favor at a rate of about half the national
average. A motion for summary judgment filed by an accused infringer
litigating in a court outside the Eastern District is over 20 percentage points
more likely to be granted at least in part than one filed in the Eastern District
of Texas. As with motions to transfer, we also see that the Eastern District of
Texas takes an unusually long time to grant summary judgment. Compared
43

We calculated these statistics by searching DocketNavigator for motions to transfer filed
between January 1, 2014 and June 30, 2016.
Here and throughout, we adopt
DocketNavigator’s conventions for determining whether a motion was granted and/or denied:
“Granted Includes orders (i) granting a motion, and (ii) recommending that a motion be
granted. Denied Includes orders (i) denying a motion, (ii) denying a motion as moot, (iii)
denying a motion without prejudice, (iv) striking a motion, (v) striking a motion without
prejudice, (vi) vacating a motion, (vii) recommending that a motion be denied, and (viii)
recommending that a motion be denied as moot. Partial Includes orders (i) denying or
granting a motion in part, or (ii) recommending that a motion be denied and granted in part.
Other Includes orders which were not included in Granted, Denied or Partial.”
DocketNavigator, Case Management, https://www.docketnavigator.com/stats (last accessed
Sept. 2, 2016).
44
We collected this statistic from Lex Machina. The medians reported are the median days to
termination for cases in the listed populations that were terminated due to inter-district
transfers between January 1, 2014 and June 30, 2016.
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the Northern and Central Districts of California, the gap exceeds a year in
duration. Even relative to the national median, the Eastern District is more
than 100 days slower.
Table 5: Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment
in Patent Cases by District (Jan. 2014 - June 2016)
Num.45

Grant

Deny

Partial

Other

Median Days
to SJ46

E.D. Tex.

227

40 (17.6%)

135 (59.5%)

19 (8.4%)

33 (14.5%)

1053

D. Del.

243

78 (32.1)

94 (38.7)

44 (18.1)

27 (11.1)

969

C.D. Cal.

149

53 (35.6)

56 (37.6)

20 (13.4)

20 (13.4)

552

N.D. Cal.

163

55 (33.7)

72 (44.2)

25 (15.3)

11 (6.7)

694

D.N.J.

45

15 (33.3)

26 (57.8)

3 (6.7)

1 (2.2)

1273

N.D. Ill.

73

26 (35.6)

32 (43.8)

10 (13.7)

5 (6.8)

1180

S.D.N.Y.

58

25 (43.1)

25 (43.1)

6 (10.3)

2 (3.4)

1153

S.D. Fl.

26

12 (46.1)

13 (50)

1 (3.8)

0 (0)

662

S.D. Cal.
All Other
Districts
All Except
E.D. Tex.

46

10 (21.7)

33 (71.7)

3 (6.5)

0 (0)

925

607

204 (33.6)

305 (50.2)

62 (10.2)

36 (5.9)

944

1,410

478 (33.9)

656 (46.5)

174 (12.3)

102 (7.2)

909

1,637

518 (31.6)

791 (48.3)

193 (11.8)

135 (8.2)

911

Total

Next, because East Texas patent cases are both unlikely to be transferred
out of the district and unlikely to be completely resolved by summary
judgement, they are (unless settled first) disproportionately likely to go to trial.
As shown below in Table 6, cases tried in the Eastern District are relatively
likely to be tried to a jury, and East Texas juries are in turn disproportionately
likely to side with patentees. That said, Eastern District jury verdicts are far
from the most plaintiff-friendly in the country, and East Texas juries find for
the patentee only slightly more often than the national average. Moreover,
while damages awarded by East Texas juries exceed the national average by a
large margin, median jury awards in East Texas are actually quite modest—a

45

We calculated these statistics by searching DocketNavigator for motions for summary
judgement filed by accused infringers in cases in the listed populations between January 1,
2014 and June 30, 2016.
46
We collected this statistic from Lex Machina. The medians reported are the median days to
termination in cases resolved by summary judgment (in favor of either party) between January
1, 2014 and June 30, 2016.
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fact suggesting that, while large awards are certainly possible in East Texas
patent trials, they are relatively rare.47
Table 6: Trials and Damages Awards in Patent
Cases by District (Jan. 2014 - June 2016)
Trials

E.D. Tex.

Damages Awards

Num.48

% Jury
Trials49

% Won by
Patentee

Num.50

43

81.8%

60.0%

19

Median
$6,970,381

Mean
$76,741,070

Num. in
Top 10
(2014-16)
2

D. Del.

68

54.9

74.1

12

$15,500,000

$83,233,792

2

C.D. Cal.

15

45.5

20.0

3

$13,488,765

$48,372,672

1

N.D. Cal.

25

82.9

46.2

14

$8,320,000

$45,475,067

3

D.N.J.

23

0.0

54.5

0

N.D. Ill.

8

50.0

50.0

1

S.D.N.Y.

17

26.7

50.0

4

$3,494,518

$9,634,759

0

S.D. Fl.

3

75.0

50.0

2

$10,673,289

$10,673,289

0

S.D. Cal.
All Other
Districts
All Except
E.D. Tex.

3

100.0

100.0

3

$2,166,654

$95,160,551

1

101

61.5

55.3

33

$7,800,000

$18,419,845

1

263

56.2

57.9

72

$8,376,351

$38,190,010

8

306

60.0

58.3

91

$8,099,943.00

$46,239,132.36

10

Total

-$15,884,106

-$15,884,106

0
0

Finally, the district’s high reversal rate on appeal tends to support the
belief that the district is too friendly to patent plaintiffs.51 As shown below in
47

Patentees’ ability to win large damages awards in the Eastern District of Texas is also
supported by the fact that East Texas juries are responsible for six of the thirteen largest jury
verdicts awarded in patent cases since 1995. See Chris Barry et al., 2014 Patent Litigation
Study, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, at 7, available at https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensicservices/publications/assets/2014-patent-litigation-study.pdf; Masimo Corp. v. Philips Elec. N.
Am. Corp., No. 09-cv-00080 (D. Del. 2014) (awarding $466,774,783 in damages); Smartflash
LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 13-cv-00447 (E.D. Tex. 2015) (awarding $532,900,000 in damages);
VirnetX v. Apple, No. 14-cv-00371 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (awarding $625,633,841 in damages).
48
We collected the number of trials and win rate from Lex Machina, looking at all trials
conducted between 2014 and mid-2016.
49
We collected the percentage of jury trials by searching DocketNavigator for verdicts and
findings of fact issued in cases in the listed populations between 2014 and mid-2016. Thus,
this statistic does not include any trials that settled or otherwise ended prematurely before a
verdict was issued.
50
We collected data on damages awards by searching DocketNavigator for awards issued in
cases in the listed populations between 2014 and mid-2016. These statistics exclude any
amounts awarded in default judgments.

[Draft v. 9/21/2016]

18

Patent Litigation in the E.D. Tex.

Table 7, appeals from the Eastern District of Texas are disproportionately
likely to be successful. Since 2014, the Federal Circuit has reversed the
Eastern District of Texas, at least in part, in about 45 percent of appeals.
Many other popular districts, by contrast, have affirmance rates that are twenty
or more percentage points higher than the Eastern District’s.52
Table 7: Patent Appellate Outcomes by District (Jan. 2014 - June 2016)53
Num. Fed.
Cir. Rulings

Affirmed

Reversed

Mixed

Other

E.D. Tex.

55

29 (52.7%)

17 (30.9%)

8 (14.5%)

1 (1.8%)

D. Del.

89

68 (76.4)

15 (16.9)

5 (5.6)

1 (1.1)

C.D. Cal.

52

41 (78.8)

5 (9.6)

5 (9.6)

1 (1.9)

N.D. Cal.

51

37 (72.5)

6 (11.8)

8 (15.7)

0 (0)

D.N.J.

30

23 (76.7)

3 (10)

4 (13.3)

0 (0)

N.D. Ill.

16

10 (62.5)

4 (25)

2 (12.5)

0 (0)

S.D.N.Y.

45

26 (57.8)

5 (11.1)

13 (28.9)

1 (2.2)

S.D. Fl.

16

9 (56.3)

5 (31.3)

1 (6.3)

1 (6.3)

S.D. Cal.
All Other
Districts
All Except
E.D. Tex.

18

10 (55.5)

3 (16.7)

5 (27.8)

0 (0)

207

126 (60.9)

41 (19.8)

31 (15.0)

9 (4.3)

524

350 (66.8)

87 (16.6)

74 (14.1)

13 (2.5)

579

379 (65.5)

104 (18.0)

82 (14.2)

14 (2.4)

Total

Overall, we find that while the Eastern District has among the most
patentee-friendly outcomes in the U.S. However, we also observe that it is
comparable in many respects to other districts that see far fewer filings. And
in some respects, cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas actually have
51

Interestingly, early on, many pointed to the Eastern District of Texas’s low rate of reversal
as evidence of a lack of bias in favor of patentees. See Pusey, supra note _, at 1D (“Judge [T.
John] Ward . . . says [complaints about plaintiff-friendly bias are] overstated, and appellate
statistics support his view. Only once has he been overruled in a patent matter, and even then,
only partially.”).
52
See also Teresa Lii, Shopping for Reversals: How Accuracy Differs Across Patent Litigation
Forums, 12 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 31, 43-45 (2013) (finding that the Eastern District of
Texas’s reversal rate on appeal between 2009 and March 2012 was significantly higher than
the overall mean); Ryan Davis, EDTX Judges’ Love Of Patent Trials Fuels High Reversal
Rate, Law360, Mar. 8, 2016, http://www.law360.com/articles/767955/edtx-judges-love-ofpatent-trials-fuels-high-reversal-rate (“The Federal Circuit affirmed decisions coming out of
the patent hotbed of the Eastern District of Texas only 39 percent of the time in 2015, while
the rate for other patent-heavy districts was around 70 percent . . . .”).
53
We collected the data in this table by searching DocketNavigator for Federal Circuit
decisions issued between 2014 and mid-2016.
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worse outcomes for patentees. Perhaps most notably, both the District of
Delaware and that Northern District of California saw higher median and
mean jury awards during our period of study, and both district held almost as
many trials as the Eastern District despite seeing far fewer filings. Together,
these findings once again make us skeptical that a marginal tendency to favor
patent enforcers in substantive decision-making is the driving force behind the
Eastern District’s popularity. Though relative advantages on the merits likely
play a role in the district’s dominance of filings, they do not strike us as
sufficiently stark on net to account for such a great disparity in filings.
C. Discovery Deadlines and Pretrial Motions Practice
Ultimately we find neither traditional explanation particularly satisfying
when viewed in isolation. Rather, we conclude that the true appeal of East
Texas is more subtle and stems from the combined effect of a number of
marginal procedural advantages, including the relative timing of discovery,
rulings on procedural motions, and judicial scrutiny of infringement claims.
Figure 1 below shows a timeline of discovery and other pretrial deadlines
taken from a sample of recent scheduling orders issued by Judge Gilstrap in
cases litigated in the Eastern District of Texas and by Judge Leonard Stark,
who has the largest patent docket in the District of Delaware.54 The numbers
shown in parentheses represent the median number of days from the complaint
to each of the deadlines set in our sample of scheduling orders. In addition,
we have added to each timeline the median number of days from filing to a
ruling on motions to transfer for each judge’s respective district.55

54

Using Lex Machina, we identified the last ten scheduling orders issued by each judge prior
to June 30, 2016. These orders are largely uniform across cases because both judges
encourage litigants to refer to model scheduling orders. Sample Docket Control Order for
Patent Cases Assigned to Judge Rodney Gilstrap and Judge Roy Payne,
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=22244; Revised Patent
Form
Scheduling
Order,
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Chambers/LPS/PatentProcs/LPSPatentSchedOrder-Non-ANDA.pdf.
55
See supra tbl. _.
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Figure 1: Comparison of Median Number of Days from Filing
to Various Pretrial Deadlines and Dates

* Median days to transfer for each judge’s respective district.

As the figure shows, discovery both begins and ends earlier in cases
litigated before Judge Gilstrap. Every discovery deadline occurs earlier on
Judge Gilstrap’s scheduling order, generally by 50 to 100 days. In fact, these
figures probably understate the differential in practice because, in our
experience, Judge Gilstrap is less likely than most judges to allow parties to
later extend these deadlines.56 As a result, parties sued for infringement in the
Eastern District begin to incur discovery costs—the single largest expense in
patent litigation57—faster than similarly situated defendants litigating
elsewhere in the country.
i.

Discovery, Transfer, and Markman Dates

At the same time, the districts also differ with respect to the timing of two
other important pretrial events: rulings on motions to transfer and the date of
claim construction, or Markman,58 hearings. Compared to their colleagues in
56

This was also true of other former Eastern District judges who were popular with patent
case filers during their time on the bench. See Gerardi, supra note _ (“We have firm trial
settings. I seldom grant a motion for continuance, thus one will get a fairly quick trial.”
(quoting Judge Leonard Davis, retired)).
57
According to a survey of IP litigators, the median cost to defend a mid-sized patent suit (i.e.,
a suit with between $10 and $25 million at stake) through the end of discovery is $1.9 million,
while the total cost through the end of trial is $3.1 million. Am. Intell. Prop. L. Assoc., 2015
Report of the Economic Survey I-111.
58
Named after Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding that
claim construction is a question of law to be resolved by the court).
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the District of Delware, judges in the Eastern District of Texas take a
relatively long time to rule on motions to transfer venue. By the time cases
erroneously filed in East Texas are transferred to a new venue, most are a year
old. By contrast, judges in the District of Delaware generally transfer cases
about two months faster.
Moreover, the size of this gap alone understates the true impact that this
dichotomy has on accused infringers. Because Judge Gilstrap also orders that
document production be complete within about ten months of filing, the
relative delay in transfers means that any defendant sued in the Eastern
District (even those with no real connection to the venue) must generally
complete document production according to the rules of that district, which (in
addition to starting early) are unusually broad in scope. Judge Gilstrap’s
sample discovery order, for example, requires production or inspection of “all
documents . . . that are relevant to the pleaded claims or defenses,” a
requirement written to be so broad that it “obviate[s] the need for requests for
production.”59 Local Rule 26(a) also makes clear that when it comes to
discovery in the Eastern District of Texas there are “No Excuses”— responses
are required regardless of any “pending motions to dismiss, to remand, or to
change venue.”60
In addition, the relatively early deadlines for the completion of all other
forms of discovery also weigh against accused infringers. In a median patent
case litigated in the Eastern District of Texas, fact discovery will end 66 days
sooner, and expert discovery 157 days sooner, than in the District of Delaware.
As a result, otherwise similarly situated defendants litigating in East Texas
will be required to incur the high costs of discovery more quickly than their
counterparts litigating elsewhere. Once again, the duration of this gap alone
understates the impact on accused infringers. As shown in Figure 1, both
districts also differ with respect to the relatively timing of discovery cutoffs
and the Markman hearing. As a result, even though Judge Gilstrap generally
schedules Markman hearings two to three months earlier than Judge Stark,
litigants in Delaware nonetheless have three months longer to conduct
discovery post-Markman. In our experience, accused infringers (but not
plaintiffs looking for a quick settlement) strongly prefer to conduct the bulk of
their own discovery only after the court has ruled on the scope of the asserted
59

Sample Discovery Order for Patent Cases Assigned to Judge Rodney Gilstrap and Judge
Roy Payne, http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=22243 (last
accessed Sept. 1, 2016). The phrase “relevant to any party’s claim or defense” is also broadly
defined in the District’s Local Rules. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
Local Rules and Appendices §26(d) (Dec. 1, 2015), www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgibin/view_document.cgi?document=1164
60
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas Local Rules and Appendices §26(a)
(Dec. 1, 2015), www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=1164.

[Draft v. 9/21/2016]

Patent Litigation in the E.D. Tex.

22

claims. Due to the inherent indeterminacy of patent claim scope, it is often
unclear how a case will be litigated on the merits until after claim construction
takes place.61 As a result, Judge Gilstrap’s scheduling practices often force
defendants to decide whether to cram the most crucial aspects of their own
discovery into the short window following claim construction or, instead, to
shoot in the dark before important terms have been defined.
ii.

Predictably Expensive

It is the combined effect of the series of procedural shifts described above
that, we believe, actually explains the bulk of the Eastern District’s popularity
and its case composition. In combination, East Texas’s tendency to impose
relatively fast and firm discovery deadlines and to issue substantive rulings
relatively late in cases facilitates precisely the kind of high volume, low value
patent litigation that the Eastern District of Texas has become infamous for.62
This is because the relative timing of discovery, transfer, and Markman
ensures that, by virtue of being sued in the Eastern District, an accused
infringer will be forced to incur large discovery costs, regardless of the case’s
connection to East Texas or the merits of its infringement contentions.
The result is an opportunity for patentees to file large numbers of cases and
offer to settle them for amounts few defendants will find it rational to decline.
And, indeed, that is what we see in the data discussed above: the Eastern
District is uniquely attractive to plaintiffs that (i) do not sell products of their
own, and thus have few documents of their own to produce, (ii) enforce high
tech patents that can be asserted broadly against many accused infringers, and
(iii) generally settle quickly. As shown below in Table 8, five of the ten
patentees that filed the most suits during the period of our study filed
exclusively in the Eastern District of Texas and another two filed the majority

61

On the difficulty inherent in determining claim scope, see, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 29 (2005); Mark A. Lemley,
The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 101 (2005).
62
As then-Chief Judge Leonard Davis once aptly put it: “If I could sum it up [i.e. why the
Eastern District is so popular] in one word, I would say predictability.” Gerardi, supra note _.
As mentioned supra in note _, this predictability includes patentees’ ability to select (with a
very high degree of probability) which Eastern District judge will be assigned to their cases,
something that isn’t possible elsewhere in the country. See Symposium, supra note _, at 25758 (explaining that one reason the Eastern District of Texas is more popular than other district
with similar local patent rules is “that there is something happening in the Eastern District that
you do not have in the big commercial areas—lawyers generally know who their judge is
going to be in the Eastern District of Texas” (statement of Mike McKool, Partner, McKool
Smith)). Accordingly, patentees who wish to take advantage of Judge Gilstrap’s standard
docket control and discovery orders can do so today with 95 percent certainty by filing suit in
Marshall.
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or plurality of their suits in East Texas.63 Law firms have also specialized to
meet the needs of high-volume litigants like these. The Tadlock Law Firm, for
example, has represented patentees in over one thousand cases filed in the
Eastern District of Texas since 2012. Those cases have a median time-totermination of just 172 days, and only three have gone to trial.64
Though we lack data on settlement amounts, it is our personal experience
that many cases in the Eastern District of Texas settle for between $30,000 and
$100,000, amounts that reflect more than anything a fraction of the
defendants’ anticipated cost of defense.65 We think it likely that the tendency
toward large numbers of small settlements also explains, at least in part, the
relatively low level of damage awards that we see in most East Texas trials.
Because cases are litigated in this fashion, by the time many patents are tried
to a jury (if ever) in the Eastern District of Texas, those patents have been
licensed numerous times for small amounts. If entered into evidence, these
prior licenses make it hard for the patentee to credibly ask the jury to award a
large sum of damages.

63

See also John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent
Litigants, 99 Geo. L.J. 677 (2011) (finding that patent plaintiffs that sued eight or more times
were more likely than other patent enforcers to settle and also much more likely to lose on the
merits of their cases if pushed to a trial or judgment).
64
We collected this information from Lex Machina by searching for firms that have served as
counsel in the largest number of patent suits.
65
For additional anecdotal support consider, for example, the litigation practices of Lodsys
and Innovatio. See David Ruddock, Patent Trolls: What Is Lodsys Actually Asking App
Developers to Pay? You Might Be Surprised, Android Police (Nov. 2, 2011),
http://www.androidpolice.com/2011/11/02/patent-trolls-what-is-lodsys-actually-asking-appdevelopers-to-pay-you-might-be-surprised; Gregory Thomas, Innovatio’s Infringement Suit
Rampage Expands to Corporate Hotels, Pat. Examiner, Sept. 30, 2011,
http://patentexaminer.org/2011/09/innovatios-infringement-suit-rampage-expands-tocorporate-hotels.
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Table 8: Most Frequent Patent Suit Filers (Jan. 2014 - June 2016)66
Party

Cases

% Filed in
E.D. Tex.

% Terminated

Median Days
to Term.

100%

162

0

320

0

Trials

eDekka, LLC

231

100%

Uniloc USA, Inc.

111

100

26

Shipping and Transit, LLC

160

0

84

65

0

Hawk Tech. Systems, LLC

149

8

88

107

0

Olivistar, LLC

103

99

98

182

0

Data Carriers, LLC

99

86

97

189

0

Eclipse IP, LLC

90

48

98

91

0

Blackbird Tech, LLC

72

0

53

336

0

Cryptopeak Solutions, LLC

66

100

73

131

0

Logitraq, LLC

59

100

100

130

0

1,126

63

85

130

0

Total

III. WHY HAVEN’T RECENT REFORMS AND APPELLATE
OPINIONS REDUCED THE EASTERN DISTRICT’S POPULARITY?
This conclusion, however, raises the question of why reforms enacted in
recent years—reforms targeted at PAEs and overbroad high tech patents—
have not already put an end to East Texas’s dominance. In this Part, we
review evidence that judges in the Eastern District of Texas have generally
ruled in ways that have minimized the effect of patent reform measures passed
by Congress and changes in the law articulated by higher courts. We find that
East Texas judges are disproportionately unlikely to stay cases pending postgrant challenges, to require that patentees litigate individual cases against
individual defendants, to grant early motions to dismiss on patentable subject
matter grounds, and to award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties.
A. The America Invents Act
In 2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act (AIA), the largest set
of reforms to U.S. patent law since 1952.67 Among the reforms enacted in the
AIA were two specifically designed to curb the practice of filing patent suits in
order to extract settlements that largely reflect defendants’ desire to avoid the
high cost of defense, rather than the strength and value of the asserted claims.
66

The data in this table relies on a combination of information obtained from Unified Patents
and Lex Machina. We obtain the names of the top 10 filers from Unified and collected case
level information by searching Lex Machina for each party’s name.
67
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) [hereinafter “AIA”].
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One such reform was the expansion of procedures for administratively
challenging the validity of issued patents. Such procedures are designed to
allow the public to eliminate patents they believe are invalid using patent
office procedures that are faster, less expensive, and more broadly available
than litigation in federal district court.68 So far, the new procedures created by
the AIA—particularly inter partes review and covered business method
review—have proven very potent and, today, it is common for defendants to
seek to invalidate patents asserted against them in court.69 Concurrent with
such challenges, defendants regularly file motions to stay patent suits for the
roughly 18-month duration of the challenge.70 In conjunction with litigation
stays, post grant challenges allow an accused infringer to invalidate weak
patent rights without first incurring the high cost of discovery.
However, as shown below in Table 9, judges in the Eastern District of
Texas are less likely than their counterparts in other parts of the country to
stay lawsuits pending patent office challenges of the patent-in-suit. Judges in
the District of Delaware and Northern District of California grant motions to
stay, at least in part, over 70 percent of the time. By contrast, the grant rate in
the Eastern District of Texas is less than 58 percent. As a result, defendants
sued in East Texas are more likely to continue to rack up litigation costs early
in cases, regardless of the asserted patent’s validity.

68

See H.R. 1907, 106th Cong, 1st Sess, in 145 Cong Rec 19278 (Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of
Representative Dana Rohrabacher) (“This title was an attempt . . . to further encourage
potential litigants to use the PTO as a [sic] avenue to resolve patentability issues without
expanding the process into one resembling courtroom proceedings.”); Protecting Small
Businesses and Promoting Innovation by Limiting Patent Troll Abuse, Hearing on S .23
before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, 113th Cong, 1st Sess *3–6, 8 (2013) (“2013
Patent Troll Abuse Hearing”) (testimony of Q. Todd Dickinson, Executive Director of the
American
Intellectual
Property
Law
Association),
online
at
http://ipwatchdog.com/blog/dickinson-senate-testimony-12-17-2013.pdf (visited Oct 25, 2014)
(recounting the debate leading up to the AIA and referring to “the assertion of allegedly
invalid or overbroad patents” as “the very abuse for which AIA post-grant procedures were
created”).
69
Roughly ten percent of patents litigated between 2012 and 2014 were also challenged in a
post-grant proceeding. Brian J. Love, New Developments, New IPR Strategies Before PTAB,
Presentation to the State Bar of California I.P. Law Section, at 12 (Mar. 23, 2016), available
at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/925/ (reporting statistics compiled by Unified
Patents). Of patents challenged in post-grant proceedings between 2012 and 2014, about 80
percent were also asserted in court. Id.
70
Between 2014 and mid-2016, litigants filed almost 1,000 motions to stay litigation pending
an inter partes or covered business method review. See tbl. _ infra.
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Table 9: Motions to Stay Pending PTAB
Proceedings by District (Jan. 2014 - June 2016)71
Motions to Stay Pending Inter Partes Review

Motions to Stay Pending Covered Bus. Method Review

Num.

Grant

Deny

Partial

Other

Num.

Grant

Deny

Partial

Other

E.D. Tex.

88

46 (52.3%)

36 (40.9%)

4 (4.5%)

2 (2.3%)

43

21 (48.8%)

18 (41.9%)

1 (2.3%)

3 (7.0%)

D. Del.

95

59 (62.1)

28 (29.5)

5 (5.3)

3 (3.1)

6

2 (33.3)

2 (33.3)

2 (33.3)

0 (0)

C.D. Cal.

53

29 (54.7)

15 (28.3)

4 (7.5)

5 (9.4)

8

4 (50)

4 (50)

0 (0)

0 (0)

N.D. Cal.

112

68 (60.7)

23 (20.5)

15 (13.4)

6 (5.3)

10

7 (70)

2 (20)

1 (10)

0 (0)

D.N.J.

10

6 (60)

4 (40)

0 (0)

0 (0)

0

0 (0)

0 (0)

0 (0)

0 (0)

N.D. Ill.

36

27 (75)

6 (16.7)

2 (5.5)

1 (2.8)

11

6 (54.5)

3 (27.3)

2 (18.2)

0 (0)

S.D.N.Y.

24

16 (66.7)

4 (16.7)

0 (0)

4 (16.7)

7

5 (71.4)

1 (14.3)

0 (0)

1 (14.3)

S.D. Fl.

11

8 (72.7)

2 (18.2)

0 (0)

1 (9.1)

3

3 (100)

0 (0)

0 (0)

0 (0)

S.D. Cal.
All Other
Districts
All
Except
E.D. Tex.

21

9 (42.9)

6 (28.6)

4 (19.0)

2 (9.5)

7

6 (85.7)

1 (14.3)

0 (0)

0 (0)

362

215 (59.4)

97 (26.8)

26 (7.2)

24 (6.6)

48

31 (64.6)

10 (20.8)

3 (6.3)

4 (8.3)

724

437 (60.3)

185 (25.5)

56 (7.7)

46 (6.3)

100

64 (64)

23 (23)

8 (8)

5 (5)

812

483 (59.5)

221 (27.2)

60 (7.4)

48 (5.9)

143

85 (59.4)

41 (28.7)

9 (6.3)

8 (5.6)

Total

The AIA also sought to limit the ability of patentees to accuse a large
number of parties of infringement in a single suit. Pre-AIA it was common for
litigious patentees to sue many—sometimes dozens of—unrelated parties in a
single suit.72
This practice, while efficient for the patentee, often
disadvantaged defendants sued en masse.73 Suing large numbers of parties in
a single case, for example, allowed patentees to leverage one defendant’s local
ties to help keep litigation against many others in East Texas. In addition,
patentees also benefited from rules restricting all co-defendants to a single
brief or allotment of time for argument or trial. In the AIA, Congress sought
to limit plaintiffs’ ability to file these suits by changing the rules for joinder in
patent cases.74 As the law reads today, joinder of multiple accused infringers
71

All figures in this table were collected by searching DocketNavigator for motions to stay
that were decided between 2014 and mid-2016.
72
See, e.g., John S. Pratt & Bonnie M. Grant, Beware the Trolls: Explorers or Buccaneers,
Pat. World, Nov. 2008, at 18 (reporting that patentee Clear with Computers, LLC once sued
forty-seven defendants in a single suit).
73
See Klerman & Reilly, supra note _, at 257-60 (summarizing the Eastern District of Texas’s
liberal stance on joinder and the negative effects it can have on accused infringers sued in
multi-defendant cases).
74
See Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25
Harv. J.L. & Tech. 687 (2012) (noting that on the day before the AIA’s new joiner rules went
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is no longer permissible “based solely on allegations that they each have
infringed the patent or patents in suit.”75
However, as shown below in Table 10, it has become common in the
Eastern District of Texas for individual patent cases filed by the same plaintiff
to be consolidated post-filing back into what is effectively a single suit for pretrial purposes. Though grant rates are relatively high for these motions
nationwide, judges in the Eastern District of Texas grant them virtually every
time. In addition, while these motions are relatively rare in most other
districts, they are common in East Texas. On a per case basis, the Eastern
District of Texas sees three times more motions to consolidate than the District
of Delaware and Northern District of California. In absolute terms, the
Eastern District of Texas sees more motions to consolidate than all other
districts combined. In fact, these statistics likely understate the gap between
districts because, in our experience, it is common for judges in the Eastern
District to consolidate cases sua sponte, without a motion ever being filed.76
Table 10: Consolidation of Patent Cases
by District (Jan. 2014 - June 2016)77

E.D. Tex.

Num.

Grant

Deny

Partial

Other

552

542 (98.2%)

7 (1.3%)

3 (0.5%)

0 (0%)

D. Del.

68

62 (91.2)

5 (7.3)

1 (1.5)

0 (0)

C.D. Cal.

38

25 (65.8)

4 (10.5)

6 (15.8)

3 (7.9)

N.D. Cal.

24

21 (87.5)

3 (12.5)

0 (0)

0 (0)

D.N.J.

116

108 (93.1)

7 (6.0)

0 (0)

1 (0.9)

N.D. Ill.

13

11 (84.6)

1 (7.7)

1 (7.7)

0 (0)

S.D.N.Y.

13

8 (61.5)

4 (30.8)

0 (0)

1 (7.7)

S.D. Fl.

20

10 (50)

6 (30)

0 (0)

4 (20)

S.D. Cal.

16

14 (87.5)

2 (12.5)

0 (0)

0 (0)

All Other Districts

156

119 (76.3)

27 (17.3)

8 (5.1)

2 (1.3)

All Except E.D. Tex.

464

378 (81.5)

59 (12.7)

16 (3.4)

11 (2.4)

Total

1016

920 (90.5)

66 (6.5)

19 (1.9)

11 (1.1)

into effect, NPEs filed “over fifty patent infringement cases . . . against more than 800
defendants”).
75
AIA, supra note _, sec. 19(d), § 299, 125 Stat. 284, 332-33 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 299).
76
During the first six months of 2016, judges in the Eastern District of Texas issued 121 sua
sponte consolidation orders. During the same period of time, all other districts issued just 24.
DocketNavigator, Search: Documents, https://www.docketnavigator.com/browse/ (searching
for litigation events labeled “sua sponte motion to consolidate”).
77
All figures in this table were collected by searching DocketNavigator for motions to
consolidate decided between 2014 and mid-2016.
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In short, though one might have expected ex ante that the AIA would
shrink the Eastern District of Texas’s case load, it appears to have done
precisely the opposite. Since 2012, the Eastern District of Texas’s share of
patent litigation has only grown.78 While other districts generally embraced
the new reforms, judges in East Texas were more reluctant to break with
tradition and, as a result, the Eastern District retained and attracted cases filed
by patentees who also preferred the old way.
B. Recent Supreme Court Opinions
In addition to congressional action, the Supreme Court has also recently
modified several patent law doctrines in ways that tend to favor accused
infringers. In these areas as well, we observe that the Eastern District of Texas
has been reluctant embrace change.
First, in Alice v. CLS Bank the Supreme Court tackled the patentability of
software, a topic that had deeply divided the Federal Circuit for years.79 As
interpreted by lower courts, Alice all but precludes the patentability of
business methods, including those implemented in software.80 Another result
of the case was that, soon thereafter, many courts began disposing cases
asserting business method patents on the pleadings, without need for discovery
or other pretrial proceedings. In our experience, this type of quick
adjudication generally allows for business method cases to be defended for
five figures in costs, far more efficiently even than filing an inter partes or
covered business method review.81 However, as shown below in Table 11,
78

Patent suits in the Eastern District of Texas have increased since 2012, both in absolute
terms and as a share of all patent litigation nationwide. According to Lex Machina, 1,251 new
patents cases were filed in the Eastern District of Texas in 2012 compared to a national total of
5,461 patent cases. In 2015, the Eastern District saw 2,541 new patent cases, compared to
5,821 nationally. Patent Cases Filed by Year, https://law.lexmachina.com/court/table#Patenttab (last accessed Sept. 2, 2016).
79
Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
80
See, e.g., Robert R. Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a “Minor
Case” (Part 1), Bilski Blog, June 16, 2016, http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/06/twoyears-after-alice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case.html (showing the impact of Alice on
patent litigation, particularly with respect to asserted “software” and “business method”
patents); Robert R. Sachs, Two Years After Alice: A Survey of the Impact of a “Minor Case”
(Part 2), Bilski Blog, June 20, 2016, http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/06/two-years-afteralice-a-survey-of-the-impact-of-a-minor-case-part-2.html (showing the impact of Alice on
patent prosecution, particularly with respect to the rate of patentable subject matter rejections
in Tech Center 3600, “Business Methods, Construction, Transportation”).
81
Inter partes review, for example, generally costs well over a quarter million dollars. Am.
Intell. Prop. L. Assoc., 2015 Report of the Economic Survey I-141 (reporting a median cost of
$275,000 to pursue an inter partes review through a hearing before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board).
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judges in the Eastern District of Texas have been reluctant to embrace this new
practice. On a per case basis, defendants in the Eastern District of Texas filed
three to four times fewer motions to dismiss than those sued in other popular
districts. We do not believe this lack of motions to reflect a lack of merit in
potential arguments, but rather an understanding that such motions would not
be viewed favorably by the court. For example, for a period of time, Judge
Gilstrap took the exceptional step of requiring parties to request permission in
writing to file an early motion to dismiss based on Alice.82
In addition to seeing a relatively small number of early Alice motions,
judges in the Eastern District also grant these motions at a relatively low
rate—ten percentage points below the national average. Moreover, if we are
right about litigants’ reluctance to file these motions in the first place, those
motions filed in East Texas likely represent among the strongest motions that
might otherwise have been filed and, thus, the figures report here likely
understates to true gap among districts’ grant rates.
Table 11: Alice Motions to Dismiss in Patent
Cases by District (Jan. 2014 - June 2016)83
Num.

Grant

Deny

Partial

Other

E.D. Tex.

20

8 (40%)

10 (50%)

1 (5%)

1 (5%)

D. Del.

27

11 (40.7)

8 (29.6)

8 (29.6)

0 (0)

C.D. Cal.

9

5 (55.5)

3 (33.3)

1 (11.1)

0 (0)

N.D. Cal.

7

4 (57.1)

2 (28.6)

1 (14.3)

0 (0)

D.N.J.

5

1 (20)

4 (80)

0 (0)

0 (0)

N.D. Ill.

9

6 (66.7)

3 (33.3)

0 (0)

0 (0)

S.D.N.Y.

2

0 (0)

1 (50)

1 (50)

0 (0)

S.D. Fl.

0

0 (0)

0 (0)

0 (0)

0 (0)

S.D. Cal.
All Other
Districts
All Except
E.D. Tex.

2

1 (50)

1 (50)

0 (0)

0 (0)

42

26 (61.9)

10 (23.8)

5 (11.9)

1 (2.4)

103

54 (52.4)

32 (31.1)

16 (15.5)

1 (1.0)

123

62 (50.4)

42 (34.1)

17 (13.8)

2 (1.6)

Total

82

See, e.g., Kevin Penton, Judge Gilstrap Rewrites Rules For Alice Motions In Texas,
Law360, Nov. 12, 2015, http://www.law360.com/articles/726270/judge-gilstrap-rewritesrules-for-alice-motions-in-texas.
83
All figures in this table were collected by searching DocketNavigator for motions to dismiss
decided between 2014 and mid-2016 that cite to Alice v. CLS Bank (i.e., included the text
“Alice” within six words of the text “CLS”).
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The Supreme Court again made waves in the patent world in Octane
Fitness v. ICON Health & Fitness when it lowered the bar for awarding
attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in patent suits.84 The decision came at a
time when Congress was considering the Innovation Act, which would have
made fee awards all but mandatory in patent suits, and the Court may well
have been influenced by congressional interest in deterring abusive patent
assertion.85 Since that time, fee awards in patent suits have become both more
common and more substantial in size.86
However, as shown below in Table 12, this shift has not been uniform
across districts. Compared to the national average, the Eastern District of
Texas has seen fewer motions (per case), granted motions at a lower rate, and
awarded smaller amounts for those that were granted. Perhaps most
remarkable is the dichotomy with respect to the size of awards given. Among
the most popular districts for patent litigation, the Eastern District is the only
to have median and mean awards that fail to break into the six figures.

84

Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749 (2014) (rejecting the
Federal Circuit’s rigid, two-part test for determining whether a patent suit was “exceptional”
for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285).
85
At the time of the opinion, the Innovation Act, H.R.3309, 113th Cong. (2013), was pending
in Congress.
86
See Hannah Jiam, Note, Fee-Shifting and Octane Fitness: An Empirical Approach Toward
Understanding “Exceptional”, 30 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 611 (2015); Federal Circuit Bar
Association, A Comparison of Pre Octane and Post Octane District Court Decisions on
Motions for Attorneys’ Fees Under Section 285, (attached to a letter from Edgar Huang,
President Elect of the FCBA, to the Senate Judiciary Committee dated Apr. 13, 2015),
available at http://www.thenalfa.org/files/FCBA-Fee-Shifting-Paper.pdf.
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Table 12: Attorney Fee Motions and Awards in
Patent Cases by District (Jan. 2014 - June 2016)87
Motions for Fees

Fee Awards

Num.

Grant

Deny

Partial

Other

Num.

Median

Mean

E.D. Tex.

36

5 (13.9%)

26 (72.2%)

0 (0%)

5 (13.9%)

26

$14,849

$76,053

D. Del.

46

9 (19.6)

30 (65.2)

4 (8.7)

3 (6.5)

8

$1,197,757

$2,275,452

C.D. Cal.

48

15 (31.3)

29 (60.4)

3 (6.3)

1 (2.1)

8

$494,481

$995,934

N.D. Cal.

38

5 (13.1)

22 (57.9)

6 (15.8)

5 (13.1)

8

$1,004,708

$1,940,818

D.N.J.

12

4 (33.3)

7 (58.3)

0 (0)

1 (8.3)

2

$2,995,842

$2,995,842

N.D. Ill.

16

2 (12.5)

7 (43.7)

6 (37.5)

1 (6.3)

23

$7,500

$437,177

S.D.N.Y.

19

5 (26.3)

10 (52.6)

3 (15.8)

1 (5.3)

5

$739,743

$1,023,830

S.D. Fl.

18

4 (22.2)

13 (72.2)

0 (0)

1 (5.5)

5

$337,553

$1,345,895

S.D. Cal.
All Other
Districts
All Except
E.D. Tex.

13

7 (53.8)

5 (38.5)

0 (0)

1 (7.7)

2

$208,357

$208,357

227

39 (17.2)

136 (59.9)

15 (6.6)

37 (16.3)

36

$315,734

$1,119,034

437

90 (20.6)

259 (59.3)

37 (8.5)

51 (11.7)

97

$288,857

$1,137,061

473

95 (20.1)

285 (60.3)

37 (7.8)

56 (11.8)

123

$88,902

$912,783

Total

In short, while both Congress and the Supreme Court have modified
patent law and procedure in ways that tend to benefit accused infringers, the
manner in which cases are conducted in the Eastern District of Texas has
dulled the effects of these modifications. While some have asserted that the
Eastern District of Texas has developed practices designed to protect the local
market for patent litigation,88 our data is insufficient to support such an
assertion. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the Eastern District of Texas’s
popularity has only grown in the years since the AIA’s passage.
IV. ANALYSIS
Viewed as a whole, our findings suggest to us that Congress should
consider placing new limits on discovery and venue in patent suits. Though
patent litigation in the Eastern District of Texas tends to favor patentees in
several respects, our observations lead us to conclude that the driving force
behind the jurisdiction’s popularity is the combination of plaintiffs’ ability to
87

All figures in this table were collected by searching DocketNavigator for motions for
attorney’s fees filed between 2014 and mid-2016
88
For a discussion of whether the judges of the Eastern District of Texas engage in intentional
“forum selling” in order to attract patent litigation for the benefit of the local economy,
themselves, and their families, see Klerman & Reilly, supra note _.
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impose early, broad discovery obligations on accused infringers and
defendants’ inability to obtain an early procedural or substantive victory
through motion practice. Together, these facts make the jurisdiction attractive
to PAEs with a high-volume, low-rate patent monetization strategy. Simply
by filing a complaint in the Eastern District, these plaintiffs can predictably
and consistently impose large costs on their opponents and leverage those
costs to extract settlements that largely reflect a percentage of a defendant’s
expected litigation costs from virtually any infringer, no matter where they are
located in the U.S.
One way to counteract this leverage—and in turn to shift the focus of
patent suits from an accounting of discovery costs to an assessment of the
merits of the claim—would be to place strict limits on discovery early in
patent suits. Reforms like those found in various iterations of the Innovation
Act strike us as particularly promising examples. As passed by the House in
2013, section 3(d) of the bill would have strictly limited discovery in patent
suits prior to claim construction.89 As reintroduced in 2015, a modified
version of this subsection would have stayed discovery altogether pending
resolution of pretrial motions, including motions to transfer and motions to
dismiss on the pleadings.90 Both reforms would have a significant impact on
pretrial practice in the Eastern District of Texas. Today in the Eastern District
of Texas defendants are generally required to complete document
production—a task that alone can cost six- or even seven-figures91—well
before the court has held a claim construction hearing, let alone made a ruling,
and about fifty days before the court might grant a motion to transfer. Recent
experience with rule changes in the District of Delaware also tends to suggest
that reforms shifting the relative timing of substantive decisions and discovery
can be quite effective. In 2014, Judges Stark and Robinson of the District of
Delaware both modified their scheduling practices for patent cases to allow
early claim construction decisions.92 In response, case filings in Delaware fell
precipitously, with most plaintiffs shifting their new cases to East Texas.93
89

Innovation Act, H.R.3309, 113th Cong. § 3(d) (2013), (stating that “if the court determines
that a ruling relating to the construction of terms used in a patent claim asserted in the
complaint is required, discovery shall be limited, until such ruling is issued, to information
necessary for the court to determine the meaning of the terms used in the patent claim . . . .”).
90
Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3(d) (2015) (stating that “discovery shall be stayed if
. . . the defendant moves to . . . transfer the action . . . or . . . dismiss the action pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) . . . .”).
91
For example, a study of 45 federal civil cases conducted by the RAND Institute for Civil
Justice found a median document production cost (i.e., the total cost of collection, processing
and privilege review) of $1.8 million. Nicholas M. Pace & Laura Zakaras, Where the Money
Goes: Understanding Litigant Expenditures for Producing Electronic Discovery 17-18 (2012),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1208.pdf.
92
See, e.g., Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, “The Times They Are A-Changin’” – Delaware’s
Judge Stark Outlines New Patent Case Management Practices, Nat’l L. Rev., May 16, 2014,
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While demonstrating just how effective pretrial modifications can be,
patentees’ reaction to Delaware’s rule change also reveals how permissive
venue rules can easily scuttle otherwise effective reforms. If judges have
discretion to implement the rules in ways that tend to dull their effectiveness,
plaintiffs can and likely will flock to jurisdictions that fail to fully embrace
reforms. The end result may well be a “race to the bottom” that exacerbates,
rather than eases, the flow of cases to plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions. In the
wake of the AIA and scheduling changes in the District of Delaware, this
appears to be precisely what we see today in Marshall, Texas.
This fact, in turn, suggests to us that venue reform may be the single
most effective reform available to policymakers. Procedural reforms, by their
very nature, are hard to implement and even harder to police. Indeed, the
discovery reforms found in both versions of the Innovation Act, though
nominally mandatory, are each followed by a list of discretionary exceptions.94
Though reasonable on their face, exceptions like these nonetheless leave the
door open for individual districts to exercise their discretion in a manner that
reduced the impact of reforms and reinforces plaintiffs’ desire to litigate there.
One way to prevent a race to the bottom is to cancel the race altogether.
Passing legislation like the VENUE Act would be a significant step in the right
direction.
CONCLUSION
Using recent data on patent litigation across the U.S., we examined the
Eastern District of Texas’s status as an outlier. While the district stands out
greatly in terms of quantity of case filings, we see less clear evidence for a
simple explanation. Though the Eastern District is relatively fast and
relatively friendly to patentees on the merits of their claims, other popular
districts often have comparable statistics and occasionally even surpass the
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/times-they-are-changin-delaware-s-judge-stark-outlinesnew-patent-case-management-pr.
93
See Jennifer J. Jedra, New Patent Suits in Eastern District of Texas Shatter Records,
http://www.myerswolin.com/general/new-patent-suits-in-eastern-district-of-texas-shatterrecords/ (reporting that “only 101 new patent cases were filed in the District of Delaware in
the second quarter [of 2014]” including “[j]ust six . . . from high-volume plaintiffs . . . .
because plaintiffs . . . see the court’s early Markman hearings as a negative in getting
defendants to settle cases there . . . . in contrast to the Eastern District of Texas, which
generally holds claim construction hearings after a great deal of pretrial discovery has been
done”); Brian J. Love, 2015 Patent Litigation Update, Presentation at the Corporate
Intellectual Property Strategy Conference, at 10 (Nov. 17, 2015), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/911/ (showing that the growth of patent cases filed
in the Eastern District of Texas between 2014 and 2015 came at the expense of case filings in
the District of Delaware).
94
H.R.3309, 113th Cong. § 3(d); H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3(d).
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Eastern District, for example with respect to speed, number of trials, and size
of jury verdicts.
Rejecting these traditional explanations as overly simplistic, we then
took a look at the relative timing of pretrial litigation events. Here, we found
that the patent plaintiffs suing in the Eastern District benefit from the district’s
combination of early, broad discovery deadlines with late action on motions to
transfer, motions for summary judgment, and claim construction. Though our
analysis is purely descriptive, we believe that the evidence points to this
combination as the primary driving force behind the popularity of East Texas.
A virtual guarantee that accused infringers will be forced to incur large
discovery costs well before they are given a shot to move or win the case,
opens the door for patentees to profitably pursue high volume, low value
litigation and this is precisely the phenomenon that appears to drive the
popularity of East Texas.
Consistent with our theory, case filings in East Texas are dominated by a
relatively small number of frequent filers that virtually always settle quickly
and, anecdotally, for relatively small sums. It should come as no surprise then
that docket speed and merits decisions do not stand out in our study. These
patentees care little about the timing of trial because they have little intention
of ever making it that far. Likewise, they care little about the rate of success
on summary judgment and in jury verdicts because they price their settlements
at levels that primarily reflect expected litigation costs, not damages.
On the one hand, our conclusions are discouraging. Today, patentees
can and often do seek out districts that offer procedural and substantive
advantages, and are able to leverage these advantages to extract larger
settlements from accused infringers. As a result, reforms that apply only in
individual courts or that leave individual courts broad discretion to decide how
general reforms will be implemented, may (despite reformers’ best of
intentions) ultimately serve to further exacerbate the accumulation of cases in
plaintiff-friendly courts, as scheduling changes in Delaware and some portions
of the AIA appear to have done for the Eastern District of Texas. In light of
these considerations, venue reform stands out as an appealing solution that
bypasses both plaintiffs’ ability to “shop” for friendly venues and courts’
ability to “market” their jurisdiction to a particular type of litigant.
Alternatively, our findings suggest that, in order to be effective, reforms
should be mandatory and crafted to limit courts’ ability to modify or otherwise
undermine them. Mandatory discovery delays like those included in the
Innovation Act may be particularly effective.
At the same time, our findings are also encouraging. If problematic
patent litigation largely stems from a small number of repeat litigants, then it
may be possible to craft a simple, targeted solution. Relatively small shifts in
the economics of patent litigation, provided they are unavoidable, could have
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outsized impact on the prevalence of cost-fueled patent suits. We believe that
venue reform and mandatory discovery delays are two that Congress should
give very serious consideration.

